In the event of a possible conflict between the United States (US) and China in the Pacific Ocean, the US Army’s most critical contribution could be long-range missile technology. Munitions such as the short-range Precision Strike Missile, the Typhon Strategic Medium Range Firing System and the Dark Eagle Long Range Hypersonic Weapon are capable of hitting strategic targets such as Chinese ports at a distance of 1,000 to almost 3,000 kilometres.
However, this capability raises an interesting dilemma within US military strategy: Destroy the enemy’s strategic infrastructure or preserve it for post-war peace and the global economy?
Protecting Ports Instead of Shooting Them: A Controversial Theory
Captain Micah Neidorfler, an Army National Guard officer, questions this traditional strategy in an article published in Military Review. Neidorfler warns that damaging Chinese ports or seizing Chinese economic facilities is a bad idea and argues that the Army should “protect China’s maritime transport infrastructure during the conflict so that it can be used after the war”.
The basic premise of this thesis is that despite decades of US efforts to disengage economically from China, the US is still dependent on the Chinese economy in many areas, from iPhones to rare earth elements. A large part of the global manufacturing industry is based on Chinese industry. According to Neidorfler, the complete destruction of Chinese ports risks collapsing the global or US economy, rendering any US victory futile.
Duality Solution: Temporary Dysfunction
While Neidorfler supports the thesis of not targeting harbours, he suggests that certain targets can be hit that will render a harbour temporarily dysfunctional, but will not cause long-term damage. Ports are complex structures consisting of a large number of sensitive components such as cranes, piers and storage tanks. Neidorfler notes that the destruction of these subcomponents would serve the strategic purpose of preventing or reducing functionality during wartime, without threatening the long-term functionality of the harbour.
At the same time, this approach significantly reduces the escalatory nature of completely destroying the ports and allows for a rapid revitalisation of post-war trade.
The Army’s Wider Role in the Pacific
Neidorfler’s views are linked to a broader discussion of the Army’s role in a conflict in the Pacific. Neidorfler argues that the niche capabilities the Army has focused on over the past decade, such as long-range fires, command and control and sustainment of the joint force, and air defence, are vital to a war in the Pacific.
Neidorfler also presents an alternative strategy whereby the Army could use the bulk of its forces to seize China’s overseas port infrastructures in order to prevent their use as military and intelligence bases or to use them as bargaining chips. With an estimated 129 projects in which Chinese companies have a stake or are involved in operations, this could have a global impact.
However, China experts, such as Foreign Policy Research Institute researcher Lonnie Henley, are sceptical. Henley notes that the authorisation to attack Chinese ports is not certain, and it is debatable whether the Army’s long-range missiles would provide any additional benefit compared to the current inventory of missiles held by the Air Force and Navy. Henley also considers that there is no additional benefit from seizing ports in third countries.
While Neidorfler admits that his proposals are “not an intuitive strategy”, he emphasises that a Sino-American war will inevitably end in a negotiation unless a nuclear war breaks out, and concludes by arguing that “any solution must be mutually acceptable in order to be lasting”.
